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Abstract
Corporations in the US have significantly increased their usage of callable bonds in the past 10-15 years.
Whereas callable debt was issued in the past for interest rate hedging motives, the vast majority of callable
bonds issued today have call options that will enver be "in the money". This feature implies that previous
explanations for the issuance of callable debt no longer rationalize the current pattern. We present evidence on
the types of firms issuing these bonds and their usage of the proceeds, which motivates a new theory for why
firms desire these eternally "out of the money" call options. This theory captures the motives of firms in
matching the maturities of investment and financing and endogenously generates firm-specific refinancing
risk. We then embed this theory into a production-based model and show that callable bonds can expand
access to capital markets and increase investment.
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Abstract
Corporations in the US have signiﬁcantly increased their usage of callable bonds in the past 10-15
years. Whereas callable debt was issued in the past for interest rate hedging motives, the vast majority
of callable bonds issued today have call options that will enver be "in the money". This feature implies
that previous explanations for the issuance of callable debt no longer rationalize the current pattern.
We present evidence on the types of ﬁrms issuing these bonds and their usage of the proceeds, which
motivates a new theory for why ﬁrms desire these eternally "out of the money" call options. This theory
captures the motives of ﬁrms in matching the maturities of investment and ﬁnancing and endogenously
generates ﬁrm-speciﬁc reﬁnancing risk. We then embed this theory into a production-based model and
show that callable bonds can expand access to capital markets and increase investment.
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1 Introduction
One of the most salient trends in corporate debt markets in the past 10-15 years has been the increasing
prevalence of callable bonds (see ﬁgure 1). In this paper we study and explain this increase. We ﬁnd that
this increase is driven primarily by a speciﬁc type of callable bond, in which the call option of the ﬁrm to
repurchase the debt is almost never in the money (that is, the strike price of the option is almost always
higher than the value of the bond.) With this in mind, we evaluate whether previous motives related to
interest rate risk management, asymmetric information, or agency issues can explain the popularity of these
bonds. We ﬁnd that they cannot. Based on relatively new theories and evidence proposed by Mian and
Santos (2011) and Xu (2016) and others, we suggest a new motivation for why these bonds occur. Speciﬁcally,
we show that the presence of these out of the money options can help mitigate reﬁnancing or rollover risk
for the ﬁrm. We propose a simple model featuring this mechanism and use it to help explain several of the
empirical patterns that we observe (and document) over the last decade.
While initially popular in the 1980s for interest rate management purposes, the usage of callable bonds
declined signiﬁcantly with the widespread availability of OTC derivatives in the early 1990s. Academic
literature around that time suggested that the primary purpose of call options in debt were to help alleviate
agency conﬂicts or problems of asymmetric information (see e.g. Crabbe and Helwege (1994)). In the late
1990s, the usage of callable bonds began to increase, and soon the majority of bonds issued by nonﬁnancial
corporations contained call provisions. This trend has increased over time, to the point where over 90% of
bonds issued by nonﬁnancial corporations in our sample contained call provisions in each of the last 5 years.
This increase has occurred across almost all types of bonds and ﬁrms, although there are some cross-sectional
diﬀerences, as we will discuss in Section 3.
An equally interesting element of this pattern is that the usage of the sorts of callable bonds that were
popular in the 1980s peaked in 1999 and fell dramatically thereafter, representing less than 10% of the total
par value of bonds issued in 2012-2014. Instead, this increase was driven by a diﬀerent type of callable bond:
the make-whole bond. While substantially similar in terms and structure to the callable bond, the make-
whole bond contains one very important diﬀerence: the way that the strike price of the option is computed.
In particular, the strike price is computed in such a way so as to almost never be below the market value
of the bond. Thus, ﬁrms exercising the option on these bonds would almost always be doing so at strike
prices that are out of the money. Figure 2 plots the trends in both make-whole bonds and non-make-whole
callable bonds for the ﬁrms in our sample.
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This important distinction has several implications. First, as we will show in Section 4, these make-whole
provisions completely remove any interest rate motives for having an embedded call option. Moreover, the
agency and asymmetric information stories that potentially explain why callable bonds were issued in the
1990s cannot explain the issuance of make-whole bonds. The structure of the strike prices precludes the
manager/equityholders from having the proper incentives and several of their empirical predictions do not
hold for the new class of make-whole bonds.
Since these theories do not hold for the new bond structures and are not well-supported by the new
empirical evidence, we begin our proposal of a new theory of the issuance of make-whole debt by documenting
a few novel stylized facts. First, we show that ﬁrms that are likely to have higher credit risk (as measured by
income volatility or leverage) are more likely to issue make-whole bonds. Second, we show that, compared to
the proceeds of other bonds, ﬁrms are more likely to use the proceeds of make-whole bonds for the purposes
of investment. Based on these two facts, we propose a theory for the issuance of make-whole bonds where
the primary reason that ﬁrms prefer bonds of this type is to avoid the potential for reﬁnancing risk. This
risk is a topic that has been explored in several other recent papers (e.g. Xu (2016)) and is highest for ﬁrms
with high credit risk and who invest immediately and so face a potential mismatch between investment and
debt maturity. We embed this reﬁnancing risk in a simple model and show that make-whole bonds can help
ﬁrms previously frozen out of credit markets access capital and allow other ﬁrms to borrow more.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it draws upon the early reasons advanced
for the usage of callable bonds by ﬁrms. One such reason is interest rate risk management by ﬁrms, which
is discussed in Kraus (1973), building upon the work of Kalyman (1971) and Weingartner (1967), among
others. Given that the motivation for interest rate risk management through bond options became somewhat
moot with the introduction of OTC interest rate derivatives, new explanations were needed. Many of these
centered around agency conﬂicts; Crabbe and Helwege (1994) gives an excellent overview of this. They
identify three primary theories. The ﬁrst is the problem of managers underinvesting if equityholders do not
beneﬁt from the returns, a problem identiﬁed by Myers (1977). Bodie and Taggart (1978) show that callable
debt can help resolve this problem. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) identify two further potential agency
conﬂicts: the ﬁrst stemming from asymmetric information (as also discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984))
and the second from risk-shiftng on the part of managers. These theories will be discussed in more detail
in Section 4. The empirical work testing these theories is also quite relevant as it helps identify testable
predictions and testing methodologies. Thatcher (1985), Mitchell (1991) and Kish and Livingston (1992)
were among the early works to test these hypotheses. More recently, Banko and Zhou (2010) and Guntay,
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Prabhala, and Unal (2013) have tested some of these hypotheses. Our paper will diﬀer from both groups
in that we use the additional characteristic of the more recent bonds as make-whole to more rigorously test
these hypotheses (and also in that we use a more comprehensive and newer set of data.)
After a thorough analysis of existing explanations for callable debt, we then propose our own explanation
for the prevalence of make-whole bonds relying on the ideas of reﬁnancing risk and maturity management.
Although the idea of matching the maturities of assets and debt is a fairly well-established one (see e.g.
Modigliani and Sutch (1966) and Myers (1977)), the idea of rollover risk impacting ﬁrm decisions is one that
is only now gaining much attention. Recent paper such as Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009), Mian and Santos
(2011), and Xu (2016) study this extensively. The last of these three, by discussing the impact of callable
debt, is particularly related to this paper. This model also builds upon the more canonical models of debt
dynamics, such as Leland and Toft (1996), although the structure is a bit diﬀerent.
The next section will discuss precisely what the diﬀerences between make-whole and traditional callable
debt are and present evidence on other forms of early reﬁnancing. Section 3 then discusses the data used in
the paper and presents several empirical trends, notably on the cross-sectional diﬀerences in debt issuance
and on the use of proceeds from debt issuance, that will be useful in motivating the model. Following
that, Section 4 builds upon Sections 2 and 3 by showing how previous explanations for the usage of callable
debt run afoul of either the new institutional characteristics of make-whole debt or the more recent empirical
trends. Section 5 presents an alternative model for make-whole debt relying upon incomplete capital markets,
reﬁnancing risk, and costs of ﬁnancial distress. The results of this model are also presented in this section.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
This section covers two important pieces of institutional background. The ﬁrst subsection discusses the
diﬀerence between traditional callable bonds and make-whole bonds and the second subsection reviews the
other methods by which a ﬁrm may retire its debt early.
2.1 Callable and Make-Whole Bonds
The feature diﬀerentiating callable bonds from noncallable bonds is a call provision, which the issuer of
the debt (in this case the ﬁrm) can exercise to repurchase its debt from bondholders. This call provision
contains a number of important details. First, it speciﬁes a window during which the bond may be called.
This window may be from issuance until the maturity of the bond or only cover a subset of the time that
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the bond is outstanding. Second, like a traditional call option, the call provision speciﬁes a strike price at
which the bond may be called. This is where the key diﬀerence between traditional callable and make-whole
bonds comes, and so we examine it in further detail. 1
For purposes of our analysis, we consider two primary classes. The ﬁrst is the case of traditional callable
bonds, such as those that were issued throughout the 1980s. Nearly all callable debt issued until 1994 was
of this form. These bonds specify a call price (expressed as a percentage of par) at which a ﬁrm may call
the bond. This price is typically either ﬁxed or varies with time (usually decreasing monotonically) over the
length of the call window. Importantly, this is the only dimension along which the price can vary. That is,
the path of the strike price of the call option requires depends only on the date. An example of a bond with
this traditional call provision comes from Wells Fargo's 17-year $13.7 million notes issued on June 17, 2014,
which state:
The notes are redeemable by Wells Fargo, in whole or in part, on any interest payment date
occurring on or after June 17, 2019 at 100% of their principal amount plus accrued and unpaid
interest to, but excluding, the redemption date.
The second class consists of make-whole bonds, which have a strike price structure that has one important
change. For make-whole calls, the strike price is set to be the maximum of the par value (or some ﬁxed
percentage of the par value) and a proxy for the market value of the bond. This market value proxy is
computed by taking the remaining interest and principal payments of the bond and discounting them at a
fairly low interest rate, usually given by a benchmark Treasury rate plus some fairly low ﬁxed spread. It is
important to note that this ﬁxed spread is usually set to be below whatever spread the ﬁrm could borrow
at in the open market, even under the best conditions. An example of a bond with this provision is Coca
Cola's November 1, 2013 issue of four ﬁxed rate bonds due in 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2023:
1 There may be other features included in call provisions, including multiple tiers of calls which specify diﬀerent prices for
diﬀerent date ranges of calls (and in some cases also restrict the number of bonds that can be called) and provisions which specify
certain conditions under which a bond issuer may or may not call (these may be either ﬁrm speciﬁc or macroeconomic conditions,)
but these are not highly prevalent. There does, however, exist some literature on ﬁrms optimally choosing call provisions to
reduce agency costs, among other things (see e.g. Thatcher 2005.) We largely abstract away from these considerations.
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We may redeem any series of ﬁxed rate notes at our option and at any time, either as a whole or
in part. If we elect to redeem a series of ﬁxed rate notes, we will pay a redemption price equal to
the greater of:
• 100% of the principal amount of the notes to be redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest;
and
• the sum of the present values of the remaining scheduled payments, plus accrued and unpaid
interest.
In determining the present value of the remaining scheduled payments, we will discount such
payments to the redemption date on a semi-annual basis (assuming a 360-day year consisting of
twelve 30-day months) using a discount rate equal to the Treasury rate plus 5 basis points for the
2016 notes, a discount rate equal to the Treasury rate plus 7 basis points for the 2018 notes, a
discount rate equal to the Treasury rate plus 10 basis points for the 2020 notes and a discount
rate equal to the Treasury rate plus 10 basis points for the 2023 notes.
This has two immediate implications. First, it means that the strike price will vary not only with time
but with market conditions. In particular, the strike price will be highest when Treasury rates are low
(generally in good times) and will be lowest when Treasury rates are high. Hence, the strike price will be
procyclical. This feature is designed to ensure that the calling of a bond does not expose bondholders to
losses due to changes in the market interest rates over the lifetime of the bond. Second, because the ﬁxed
spread to Treasuries is set to be below the spread at which a ﬁrm could realistically reﬁnance its debt, this
price will virtually never be below the market value of the bond. Put another way, if the ﬁrm were to reissue
a bond with the exact same interest payments and principal as the retired bond, it would almost certainly
receive less than it would have to pay to call the identical make-whole bond. This has the eﬀect, as alluded
to earlier, of making this call option almost never in the money in the sense that the strike price for this
call option will almost always be above the market value of the underlying asset (in this case the remaining
payments of the bond.)
The following ﬁgure gives an example of this. Consider a ﬁrm that has issued a ﬁve year bond at par
with annual coupon payments of 5.5% of the principal ($100) and wants to reﬁnance this bond at year two.
Since we know that the make-whole ﬁxed spread is usually far lower than the credit spread at which the ﬁrm
is reissuing the bond, let's assume that the credit spread at which the ﬁrm reissues is 150bps and that the
ﬁxed spread to the benchmark Treasury that the ﬁrm has to pay as stipulated in the make-whole provision
is 30bps. The following plot gives the prices that the ﬁrm would have to pay to call a traditional bond (we
assume that the call price is ﬁxed to par) and a make-whole bond, as well as the proceeds that the ﬁrm
would earn from reissuing a bond with exactly the same remaining payoﬀs as the retired bond. All lines are
plotted versus the underlying Treasury rate.
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Here, the ﬁrm proﬁts by calling its debt and reﬁnancing when the proceeds from reissuance (green line)
exceed the price paid to call the debt (red line for traditional callable debt, blue line for make-whole debt.)
Note also that this is a zero-sum game: any gain the ﬁrm makes by calling the debt below its true value
is lost by the bondholder who has to surrender an asset for less than it is worth. Here we see that, for
suﬃciently low interest rates, the ﬁrm can proﬁt if it has traditional callable debt by calling its debt at par
and then reissuing debt with the same payments for a higher value. Upon closer inspection, one sees that
once the Treasury rate drops below the coupon of the bond less the reissuance credit spread, calling debt
at par becomes valuable for the ﬁrm. This is because the interest rate at which that payment is discounted
(the Treasury rate +150bps credit spread) is lower than the coupon payment for Treasury rates less than
4%, meaning that the price of the bond is higher than par.
In contrast, it is never proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to exercise the call option on make-whole debt and reissue
its debt in this example since the credit spread at which it would have to reissue its debt is higher than the
spread that it would have to pay to buy back its debt. This means that the discount rate that the ﬁrm
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uses to value the payments that it buys back will be lower than those that will be used to value the debt
that it issues and generate the proceeds for the ﬁrm. Thus, the make-whole call price will always exceed the
proceeds from reissuance. Note also that since the make-whole call price is calculated as the maximum of
the traditional call price and the proxy for market value, it will always result in a (weakly) higher payment
by the ﬁrm.
These make-whole payment spreads are set such that they are almost always below the reissuance credit
spread for a ﬁrm and thus the ﬁrm cannot beneﬁt by calling its make-whole debt and reissuing a bond with
the exact same payment structure. Indeed, for most of the bonds in the sample the make-whole spreads range
between 5 and 50bps, far lower than the average issuance credit spread for bonds in the sample. Nevertheless,
it is worthwhile to consider the extreme case in which the reissuance credit spread is actually lower than the
make-whole spread. Figure 3 presents a graph identical to the one above, except that the reissuance credit
spread is now 0bps. Note that, since the make-whole spread is so low, the ﬁrm still requires extremely low
interest rates to be able to make even a slight proﬁt by calling its make-whole debt and reissuing an identical
bond.
2.2 Other Forms of Early Retirement
In addition to call provisions, there are two other mechanisms by which ﬁrms can retire debt early that are
worth mentioning.
First, a ﬁrm can perform an open market repurchase. Transactions such as this are typically executed
between two dealers, over the phone, with neither party knowing who the other party represents. For
example, a ﬁrm may contact an investment bank, asking it to contact pension funds or insurance companies
that hold its debt to buy the debt from them. The price is then privately negotiated between the two dealers.
There are a couple of important points to note about transactions such as this. First, as noted in Levy and
Shalev (2013), corporate bond transactions [of this type] are relatively sparse. In our complete data sample,
open market repurchases constitute 3.57% of all early bond retirements. Second, given that this is done on a
bondholder-by-bondholder basis, it is diﬃcult to retire a signiﬁcant fraction of the outstanding debt in this
way. For the 5,579 open market repurchases in the data between 1986 and 2013, the average percentage of
the debt issue retired is 24.1%. Further, in only 7% of these cases was the company able to retire all of its
debt. This mechanism, is, however, fairly inexpensive. The average price paid by the company to retire its
debt in this way is 95.23% of par.
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The second additional mechanism that the ﬁrm has for retiring early its debt is a tender oﬀer, in which
it submits a written oﬀer to bondholders informing them of the ﬁrm's desire to retire its debt early, and
oﬀering a price (typically a premium) at which the ﬁrm can buy back its debt from bondholders. Across
the 5,694 tender oﬀers from 1986 to 2013, ﬁrms tended to pay a signiﬁcant premium in tender oﬀers, as
might be expected from the fact that they are signaling to bondholders that they wish to retire the debt.
Several studies, such as Mann and Powers (2007) have cited asymmetric information as one potential reason
for these high premia. The median price as a percentage of par paid by ﬁrms was 107%, however, there
is signiﬁcant positive skew to the tender price distribution. In fact, the 75th percentile of the tender price
distribution exceeds the 98th percentile of the call price distribution. The majority of these oﬀers tend to
be ﬁxed price, according to Kruse et. al. (2013), but they can also take the forms of ﬁxed spreads or Dutch
auctions. Tender oﬀers are also a somewhat more eﬀective way for the ﬁrm to retire a signiﬁcant portion
of its debt than open market repurchases. Across our sample, the average amount retired was 62.5% of the
total debt issue (other studies have found even higher ﬁgures for far more limited early samples), and, in
13% of the cases, the ﬁrm was able to retire the entire debt issue.2
In order to synthesize all of this information, it is helpful to present the same statistics for callability.
Partial and complete calls constituted 92.78% of the early redemptions in our largest data sample. On
average, the calls retired 92.2% of the outstanding debt issue, and 91.2% of calls retired the entire debt issue.
The average price paid for all calls was 99.23% of par, and the average price paid for make-whole calls was
104.21% of par. Calls also retire far more of debt issues than either alternative method, are more often in
the data, and are subject to signiﬁcantly lower transactions cost and legal fees. Compared to open market
repurchases, 91.2% of calls retire the entire bond issue, while only 7% of repurchases do. Moreover, ﬁrms
that issue callable or make-whole debt still have the option to perform either open market repurchases or
tender oﬀers as ﬁrms with noncallable debt would. For some ﬁrms, the diﬀerence in early redemption price
between callable debt and noncallable debt is not high. For many, however, it is. Figure 4 illustrates this by
plotting the price paid for early retirement of debt as a percent of par for three types of bonds: noncallable,
traditional callable, and make-whole. We see that while the series are fairly similar for the bottom 30% of
prices, the upper 30% of prices paid to retire noncallable debt far exceeds that paid to retire either form
of callable debt. In fact, the make-whole premium looks fairly small compared to the additional premium
one might have to pay to retire noncallable debt. In summary, if a ﬁrm expects that there is some chance
that it will reﬁnance its debt early, both callable and make-whole debt seem to oﬀer far less risky and more
cost-eﬀective ways to do so.
2A third potential mechanism for early retirement is a sinking fund provision, which can enable a ﬁrm to repurchase some
of its debt each year, but these provisions are uncommon and somewhat limited in scope.
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3 Data and Empirical Trends
In this section we begin by describing the data sources employed and the methodologies used to trim the
data. The second subsection then describes empirical results about the ﬁrms more likely to issue callable
debt and the uses of the proceeds of such debt.
3.1 Data Sources and Methodologies
Two main sources of data were used for this project. The ﬁrst is the Mergent FISD ﬁxed income database,
which provides bond information. This database contains several datasets that were useful for this project,
among them the Bonds Issues Dataset, the Amount Outstanding Dataset, and the Redemption Dataset. The
Bond Issues dataset contains bond-speciﬁc information for over 350,000 bond oﬀerings between 1986 and
2014. In particular, this dataset was used to gather information such as bond par values, yields, maturity,
coupons, issue dates, callability, and other options. The dataset also provides identifying information about
bonds and their issuers, such as the issue CUSIP, issuer CUSIP, the industry of the issuer, and FISD-speciﬁc
identiﬁcation codes for both bond and issuer. One variable not included in this dataset is whether a bond is
make-whole, and for this the FISD redemption dataset was used. After merging the Redemption dataset with
the Bond Issues dataset, 193,776 observations remained. These observations were ﬁltered to focus on U.S.
corporate bonds issued by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, and were then ﬁltered to exclude certain uncommon options
and features, such as fungibility, convertibility, lease obligation issues, etc., resulting in a ﬁnal dataset of
20,166 bonds.3
For each of these bonds, FISD's Amount Outstanding dataset provides detailed descriptions of the in-
stances where the amount outstanding of each debt issue potentially changed. It begins with the issuance
of the debt and ends with the maturity or early retirement of the debt, and seems to be the most complete
source of bond calls, open market repurchases, and tender oﬀers. For each action, the dataset identiﬁes
the relevant issue, the type and date of the action, and the amount outstanding both before and after the
transaction, as well as the price of the transaction, expressed as a percentage of the issue's par value. For
the data in our sample, this dataset contained between 2 and 8 actions for each bond issue. We merged this
and the other FISD datasets using the bond-speciﬁc issue id, which uniquely identiﬁes each bond issue. The
ﬁnal dataset has just over 100,000 action-level observations.
This bond data was supplemented with the second main source of data for this project: ﬁrm data from
3More details about the exact bond features excluded and included are available upon request.
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Compustat. For this we used the Quarterly and Annual Fundamentals datasets to obtain over 50 ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables, primarily balance sheet and income statement data. Among the most important of these
were measures of asset, debt, and equity levels, debt ﬂows, dividend policies, investment ﬂows, M&A activity,
interest payments, and revenue/net income ﬁgures. We then merged this Compustat data with the combined
FISD data by matching either the CUSIP values, the company tickers, or the ﬁrst ﬁve CUSIP digits and the
company ticker. After conducting all of these merges, we then compared the results across merge categories,
ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in variables after using a relevant Holm correction for our .05 alpha level
and the number of pairwise tests.
3.2 Empirical Trends
The purpose of this section is to establish two stylized facts that will be important in motivating the model in
Section 5. The ﬁrst fact is that ﬁrms with more credit risk are more likely to use callable debt (of all forms.)
Second, we show that the usage of callable debt is closely tied to ﬁrm investment policies. Speciﬁcally, callable
debt (and in particular make-whole callable debt) is more likely to be issued to fund future investment. We
show these two facts by examining both the types of ﬁrms issuing callable debt and the use of the proceeds
from debt issuance.
We begin by examining the cross-sectional characteristics of the ﬁrms issuing callable debt. Since over
90% of bonds in our sample in recent years have been callable, we consider the trends in callability over time
of ﬁrms with diﬀerent characteristics. Using this, we can draw inferences from both the rate of adoption of
call provisions and the overall level of the prevalence of callable bonds.
The ﬁrst cross-sectional characteristic that we consider is a ﬁrm's credit risk. There are many diﬀerent
measures that one could use for this, but we choose the S&P Long-term Issuer Credit Rating as a reasonable
summary statistic of all of the factors that impact the creditworthiness of a company. Similar results also
hold if one uses leverage or the volatility of earnings. For this analysis, we use the merged Compustat-FISD
datasets and sort ﬁrms based on their credit ratings. We then separate bond issuances based on the credit
ratings of the ﬁrm issuing them at the time of issuance, and consider how the trends in callability have varied
across these ﬁrm credit ratings. Figure 5 displays the results. We see quite clearly that ﬁrms with lower
credit ratings have always had a higher level of callability in their bonds, and that they were faster to adopt
call provisions, and that this trend holds across all three groups considered. In summary, it seems evident
that credit risk and the inclusion of a call provision are positively related: the higher a ﬁrm's credit risk,
the more likely it is to include a call provision in its bond. This trend holds for make-whole bonds as well,
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which can also be seen by the fact that the increase in callable bonds in recent years is driven almost solely
by make-whole bonds.
The second fact that we hope to show is that investment and the inclusion of call provisions are directly
linked. We do this by showing two relationships. First, ﬁrms that invest more tend to issue more callable
debt. Second, ﬁrms that issue callable bonds (in particular make-whole callable bonds) are more likely to
use the proceeds of their bond issuance for investment.
We begin by considering again the trends in callability across diﬀerent levels of ﬁrm investment. We
measure investment here by ﬁrm capital expenditures4 and perform a similar sorting exercise to that done
previously. Namely, we pair bonds to matched annual capital expenditure to operating income ratios for
the ﬁrms issuing those bonds, and then sort those observations into quartiles based on the ratio in each
year (so as not to pick up the eﬀect of average ratios changing over time). We then plot the trends in
the prevalence of call provisions for each investment quartile in Figure 6. We see that ﬁrms in the lowest
quartile of investment issue a lower fraction of their bonds as callable: in recent years this level has been
roughly 20% less. Furthermore, it seems that these ﬁrms are more responsive to market conditions in
their callability. While ﬁrms with higher levels of investment maintain a high fraction of callable bonds
across market conditions, ﬁrms with lower levels of investment are more likely to decrease their usage of call
provisions in bad times, such as the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Again, this trend holds for make-whole bonds in
particular.
The ﬁnal form of evidence for the link between investment and the issuance of callable bonds comes
from studying how ﬁrms use the proceeds of bond issuance. For this we consider a slightly diﬀerent test.
Since our outcome variable is now continuous on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis, we perform a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression
of the post-issuance level of ﬁrm accounting variables on their pre-issuance level and a dummy for whether
the bond issue was a make-whole callable bond. (We can use make-whole callable bonds now since we are
not merely considering the trend over a few years.) Table 1 displays the results. We see that, relative to
non-make-whole bond issues, issuers of make whole bonds use less of the proceeds for cash and dividends
and far more for investment into property, plant, and equipment. This again demonstrates the link between
callable bonds and investment: ﬁrms that issue callable bonds, in particular make-whole callable bonds, are
those ﬁrms who have tended to invest a higher fraction of their income and who tend to use more of their
proceeds for investment.
4R&D/intangible capital not included due to a lack of reliable data
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Thus, this section has demonstrated two empirical facts. First, ﬁrms with lower credit ratings (more
credit risk) are more likely to issue callable bonds. Second, ﬁrms that invest more and that are more prone
to use their bond proceeds for investment are more likely to issue callable debt. These facts will help motivate
the model in Section 5.
4 Analysis of Previous Explanations
Before beginning with our model, we brieﬂy explore previous explanations for the issuance of callable debt
and show why these explanations cannot rationalize the current trend. We explore four theories: asymmetric
information, risk shifting, underinvestment, and interest rate risk management.
4.1 Asymmetric Information
The ﬁrst theory concerns asymmetric information. As suggested in Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980)
(BHS), managers may have more information than is available to public investors (in particular bondhold-
ers.) If this is the case, managers with positive private information who issue non-callable bonds prior to the
revelation of the information will be sharing the surplus of the revelation of that information with bondhold-
ers. This is because the revelation of that positive information will presumably reduce the default risk of the
ﬁrm (or more generally improve its creditworthiness), increasing the value of its bonds. Existing bondholders
will realize all of this beneﬁt while managers and equityholders will not beneﬁt from the appreciation in value
of the bonds.
BHS suggest a solution to this problem in the form of callable debt. Since the call option is held by
equityholders will appreciate in value by the same magnitude as the bonds, this security will appropriately
compensate equityholders for the revelation of positive information. Just as bondholders undervalue the
ﬁrm's creditworthiness (relative to the full information case), they also undervalue the call option by the
same amount and so equityholders are appropriately compensated.
While this may be true for an at-the money call option where the delta of the option is approximately
one, it is certainly not the case for make-whole debt, and therein lies the issue when one applies this theory
to the current trend. As stated previously, the options on make-whole bonds are structured so that they are
almost never in the money. Since the strike price contains such a low spread to the benchmark Treasury, the
ﬁrm's credit proﬁle would have to improve enormously for the value of the underlying bond to exceed the
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strike price. This means that the option is initially deeply out of the money, and, as such, has a delta far
below one. So, even if the ﬁrm's credit proﬁle were to improve, the value of the option would not increase by
the same value of the bond, and, in fact, would hardly increase at all. Since these options are virtually never
in the money, their value would remain close to zero over the life of the bond and even revelations of positive
information are not likely to change that. As such, equityholders will receive very little compensation for
their private information.
What this implies is that equityholders with private information will be poorly served by seeking to
mitigate this wealth transfer by issuing make-whole callable debt. There are a number of alternate solutions,
including shorter maturity debt, convertible debt, and bonds with call options that are not make-whole. But
clearly, the increase in the issue of make-whole bonds cannot be rationalized by managers seeking to ensure
that equityholders are compensated for their private information.
4.2 Risk Shifting
A second issue identiﬁed by BHS that may motivate the issue of callable bonds is risk shifting. The idea
is that after issuing noncallable debt, equityholders' claims on the ﬁrm's assets will be subordinate to a
higher ﬁxed claim by bondholders. The call option that equityholders hold on the value of the ﬁrm has a
higher strike price as more debt is issued. In maximizing the value of the ﬁrm to equityholders, therefore,
managers may be incentivized to take on riskier projects. If debtholders expect this action ex-ante, then it
will naturally reduce the price that they pay for debt when it is issued. The conﬂict here comes from the fact
that taking on such risky projects reduces value for bondholders while increasing it for equityholders. One
potential solution to this proposed by BHS, then, is to issue callable debt. Since the bond value decreases
with the adoption of these projects, the value of the call options held by the equityholders will decrease, and
this will act to temper any incentives that equityholders have to take on these projects.
In discussing this solution, Crabbe and Helwege identify a key element to eliminating the conﬂict: To
eliminate the incentive to increase risk, a ﬁrm will include a call option whose value equals the potential
gain from switching investments (page 5). While this may be possible for non-make-whole callable debt,
it is certainly not possible given the typical structure of make-whole issues, for similar reasons as discussed
above. In particular, since the call options in make-whole issues are almost always signiﬁcantly out of the
money, the value of those options is not likely to change much based on ﬁrm investments. Since the value
starts out very low for the vast majority of these issues, the adoption of risky, low-NPV projects by the ﬁrm
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cannot decrease the value by much and so will not act as an eﬀective counterweight to the incentives for
equityholders to increase the riskiness of the ﬁrm's value.
Clearly then, this motive cannot explain the recent increase in make-whole debt. Additionally, as Crabbe
and Helwege observe, this theory would also imply that riskier ﬁrms should issue bonds of lower maturities,
but this appears empirically to not be the case. For example, Xu (2016) shows that the average maturity of
speculative-grade bond issues is signiﬁcantly lower than that of investment-grade bond issues.
4.3 Underinvestment
The third agency theory that we consider is the underinvestment problem proposed by Myers (1977). This
problem arises when managers, after issuing debt, receive an investment opportunity that is likely to only
provide a payoﬀ to bondholders. An example of this, discussed in Bodie and Taggert (1978) is a ﬁrm that
has nontrivial default risk receiving news of a fairly safe project that provides a fairly low payoﬀ. Managers
seeking to maximize shareholder wealth would then prefer not to make this investment, saving their capital
for projects that can potentially beneﬁt equityholders. As with the previous case, this will reduce the ex-ante
price paid for the debt by bondholders.
The solution proposed by Bodie and Taggart is the embedding of call options in these bonds. The call
options alleviate this problem by allowing the ﬁrm to recontract based on the new project/investment and
thus allowing equityholders to be compensated for the adoption of this project. While this may hold for
traditional callable bonds, it fails with make-whole bonds. This is because even with the revelation of a
new investment project beneﬁcial to bondholders, the option embedded in a make-whole bond is still highly
unlikely to be in the money. The spreads to benchmark Treasuries that characterize the strike price of the
option are so low that the bond would need to be extremely close to risk-free for this to occur. Given that
this problem is most acute for ﬁrms with signiﬁcant default probabilities, such a transformation is wholly
unlikely. Furthermore, given that there are several other mechanisms by which ﬁrms can mitigate this conﬂict
(for example shorter maturity bonds), this hypothesis also cannot explain the risk of make-whole bonds.
4.4 Interest Rate Risk Management
The last explanation for the usage of callable debt that we consider is interest rate risk management. Al-
though proponents of this justiﬁcation have decreased over time, it is simple to show that make-whole bonds
do not oﬀer any interest rate hedges for ﬁrms. The idea behind this hypothesis is that ﬁrms that issue
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bonds at a high interest rate may seek to reﬁnance at a lower rate, beneﬁting from the reduction in interest
payments. Bonds with traditional call options enable ﬁrms to do this by allowing them to repurchase their
debt at its par value and issue debt at the prevailing (lower) market interest rate. Kraus (1973) showed that
this is a zero-sum game and hence should be priced equally by both parties (assuming the same stochastic
discount factor) and the widespread use of OTC derivatives by corporations seems to have eliminated the
need for this.
Even more strongly, note that make-whole bonds do not help ﬁrms manage interest rates. Since the call
price paid by the ﬁrm reﬂects the prevailing market interest rate, ﬁrms that issue bonds at high interest rates
and seek to reﬁnance at low interest rates will be forced to pay at least the market price of the bond, and
thus will at best earn no proﬁts. The graph and subsequent explanation in Section 2.1 illustrate this point.
Clearly then, the motive of hedging interest rate movements cannot be behind the increase in make-whole
bonds.
We have thus seen that several of the most popular explanations for why ﬁrms issue callable bonds fail to
explain the recent increase in make-whole callable debt. The asymmetric information and underinvestment
hypotheses both require managers to be potentially interested in exercising the call option to recontract,
something which is highly unlikely given the structure of make-whole call options. The risk shifting motive
requires the option to be priced such that its sensitivity to price decreases in the underlying bond is relatively
high, which is again improbable since the option is deeply out of the money at issuance. The predictions of
this theory regarding the interaction of cash ﬂow riskiness and debt maturity also seem to contradict recent
empirical evidence. Finally, the interest rate risk management story cannot rationalize make-whole bonds
almost by construction: the make-whole option is designed to insure bondholders against the risk of changes
in market interest rates, not ﬁrms.
5 Model and Results
It thus seems that we need a new theory to explain why ﬁrms have been increasingly issuing make-whole
debt. We propose that theory in this section, beginning by motivating it and providing some background
in the ﬁrst subsection. The second subsection explains the mechanism of the model and the third presents
results of the discrete model. We extend this model to a fully dynamic inﬁnite-horizon model in subsection
four.
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5.1 Motivation
The main idea behind our model is reﬁnancing risk. Put simply, ﬁrms realize that at the time at which they
reﬁnance their debt, the availability of credit and the credit spread they pay is determined based on credit
market conditions at that time. If ﬁrms wait until their debt matures to reissue, then they are forced to
either be subject to the prevailing credit market conditions or seek other forms of ﬁnancing, both of which
can be costly. In seeking to avoid these costs, ﬁrms may prefer to have a choice of reﬁnancing dates on
or before the maturity of their debt issues. Make-whole debt allows ﬁrms to do this. This hypothesis is
consistent not only with the empirical trends that we documented, but also with the results that others have
foundboth theoretical and empirical. We begin with a bit of background of reﬁnancing risk.
There has been signiﬁcant work showing that reﬁnancing during tight credit markets can be costly to
ﬁrms. Firms may have to reﬁnance at signiﬁcantly higher interest rates (Froot et. al. 1993) or worse bond
terms (He and Xiong 2012). If ﬁnancing is in short supply or altogether unavailable, ﬁrms may be forced to
liquidate excessively by creditors (Diamond 1991), sell assets in a ﬁrm sale (Choi et. al. 2013) or decrease
investment (Almeida 2009). Of course, ﬁrms may also be forced to default (He and Xiong 2012). Moreover,
this seems to be a concern that both ﬁrms and ﬁnanciers recognize. Graham and Harvey (2001) show that
CFOs claim they manage debt maturity to reduce risk of having to borrow in bad times, while credit rating
agencies commonly cite reﬁnancing risk as a reason to downgrade ﬁrms (and the reﬁnancing of debt as a
reason to upgrade ﬁrms.) A concrete example can be found in Bank of America Merrill Lynch's 2012 advice
to CFOs:
Don't wait too long to reﬁnance upcoming maturities. Give yourself at least 18 months before
your current ﬁnancing matures, so that if any segment of the market ... shuts down for a few
months, you'll still have time to get something done when the markets inevitably return to life
Bank of America cites that advice as being one of the lessons from the ﬁnancial crisis, and indeed this
is a risk that is naturally heightened by ﬁnancial crises and observed credit market freezes. In the model we
will tie this reﬁnancing risk to the issuance of make-whole debt, and we note that the fact that the issuance
of make-whole debt began to increase signiﬁcantly during the ﬁnancial crisis is one piece of evidence that
this link is valid. Another comes in the cross-sectional characteristics of the make-whole bond issuers. In
Section 3.2 we observed that ﬁrms with higher credit risk are those that issue make-whole debt at a higher
rate, and these are precisely the ﬁrms that are more likely to be aﬀected by reﬁnancing risk, since their credit
spreads are more countercyclical and their probability of accessing the credit market more procyclical. In
addition, these ﬁrms tend to be more constrained in the debt maturities that they can issue, as Xu (2016)
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shows. The other trend that we observed in Section 3.2 is that the issuance of make-whole debt and your
investment policies are closely linked: ﬁrms that invest more of their earnings tend to be more likely to issue
make-whole debt. This too is evidence for the reﬁnancing risk explanation: reﬁnancing risk is highest when
a ﬁrm requires a steady stream of income. If the ﬁrm can vary its assets side with variations in its liabilities,
reﬁnancing risk is not as large of a concern. Of course, capital investment is one of the more irreversible
forms of capital (see for instance Ramey and Shapiro (2001)). Thus, ﬁrms with heavier investment policies
are likely to have assets that are harder to adjust downwards in level and thus are likely to be more sensitive
to reﬁnancing risk.
It is also worth mentioning the several papers that have been devoted to showing this reﬁnancing risk
directly. These include Mian and Santos (2011) and Julio (2013), but perhaps the most relevant is Xu (2016).
Xu shows that speculative grade ﬁrms frequently reﬁnance early to extend the maturity of their outstand-
ing bonds, particularly under accomodating credit supply conditions and concludes that the evidence is
consistent with precautionary maturity management, in which speculative-grade ﬁrms extend maturity to
hedge against reﬁnancing risk caused by credit supply ﬂuctuations.5
5.2 Model Setup
We now propose a simple model to capture this reﬁnancing risk eﬀect and examine the impact of (make-
whole) callable debt. The model features four periods and ﬁrms who invest in the ﬁrst period. The ﬁrms
ﬁnance this investment through their own initial equity and by issuing debt of one of two forms: non-callable
or make-whole. That is, they cannot raise additional equity and we do not consider the choice between
traditional callable and make-whole. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks which determine
the return from their investments. The key friction in the model comes in the timing of investment and
ﬁnancing: ﬁrms are constrained to issue at most two-period debt, but their investment takes either two
or three periods to mature. Liquidating investment before maturity is ineﬃcient, so ﬁrms are incentivized
to reﬁnance their debt if their investment takes three periods (which they learn in the period following
investment). In this case, a ﬁrm that issued traditional callable debt has to reﬁnance at maturity of its debt
(period 2), whereas a ﬁrm that issued make-whole debt can reﬁnance in either periods 1 or 2. We will see
that this expands access to credit markets and aﬀects the optimal capital choice for these ﬁrms.
5One may ask whether non-make-whole callable debt can also achieve the purpose of mitigating reﬁnancing risk. While it
does suﬃce for that purpose, it pairs this safety with what is essentially an interest rate swaption for the ﬁrm's borrowing rate,
which may distort incentives to call when the goal is to reduce reﬁnancing risk. Make-whole debt allows bond issuers to more
precisely specify the cost of insurance for this risk and, perhaps for this reason, has become the prevailing form of callable debt
issued by US nonﬁnancial corporations.
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Firms begin with an initial amount of equity E0 that is held in cash and an opportunity at the initial
time period to invest capital k0 in a technology yielding yt(k0) = Ztk0 − αk20. Zt represents the ﬁrm's
idiosyncratic productivity, and its log follows an AR(1) process:
zt+1 = (1− ρ)µz + ρzt + σzt+1
where t+1 is drawn from a standard normal distribution. The returns from this technology materialize at
t=3 with probability p and at t=2 with probability 1 − p. To ﬁnance this capital k0, ﬁrms issue 2-period
debt D0 at time 0 maturing in time 2. They have two choices for this debt: non-callable debt, which must
be reﬁnanced in period 2, and make-whole debt, which can be reﬁnanced in either period 1 or period 2. We
denote the respective interest rates for non-callable and make-whole bonds as rNC0 and r
MW
0 . Debt is fairly
priced, and both ﬁrms and bondholders use a constant discount factor β.
The ﬁrm learns in period 1 whether its investment returns will be realized in period 2 or period 3. If
the investment matures in period 2, then the initial maturity of its debt and the maturity of its investment
match, and the ﬁrm does not need to reﬁnance its debt. However, if the investment matures in period 3,
the ﬁrm will need to obtain funding between periods 2 and 3, which requires it to reﬁnance its debt. If the
ﬁrm is unable to do so, it is forced to default and its salvage value becomes ψk0. The following diagram
illustrates the timing of events in the model:
The following diagram illustrates the timing of events in the model:
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Note that the ﬁrm has no incentive to issue make-whole debt when it reﬁnances since the ﬂexibility in
reﬁnancing date is of no value to it once it knows its investment maturity and can issue debt with the same
maturity. Thus we can denote the interest rate at which the ﬁrm reﬁnances as rNCt where either t=1 or t=2
depending on the date of reﬁnancing. Also note that the ﬁrm prefers to use its costless initial equity ﬁrst,
then ﬁnance any further investment with debt. Thus, given a level of investment, the amount that it borrows
can be written as D0 = max {0, k0 − E0} . Given this, we can write the ﬁrm's value if it issues non-callable
debt as follows:
V NC0 = max
k0
E
[
pβ3max
{
y3 (k0)−D0
(
1 + rNC0
)2 (
1 + rNC2
)
, 0
}
1{refi} + (1− p)β2max
{
y2 (k0)−D0
(
1 + rNC0
)2
, 0
}]
where the ﬁrst term represents the value if the investment takes three periods to mature and the ﬁrm is
able to reﬁnance and the second term represents the value if the investment takes two periods to mature.
Similarly, the ﬁrm's value if it issues make-whole debt is given by:
VMW0 = max
k0
E [pβ3max
{
y3 (k0)−D0
(
1 + rMW0
)2 (
1 + rNC2
)
−MWprem, 0
}
1{refi@t=2} +
max
{
y2 (k0)−D0
(
1 + rMW0
)(
1 + rNC2
)2 −MWprem, 0} 1{refi@t=1} +
(1− p)β2max
{
y2 (k0)−D0
(
1 + rMW0
)2
, 0
}
]
where the ﬁrst term represents the value if the investment takes three periods to mature and the ﬁrm
reﬁnances in the second period, the second term represents the value if the investment takes three periods to
mature and the ﬁrm reﬁnances in the ﬁrst period, and the third term represents the value if the investment
takes two periods to mature (in which case the ﬁrm does not need to reﬁnance its debt).
Thus the ﬁrm will optimally choose both its level of borrowing (and hence its level of investment) and
its type of borrowing. We will see that the choice of the latter can be quite important in terms of the ﬁrm's
access to credit markets and the price it pays for that access.
5.3 Results
There are two key results from this model. First, we show that having access to make-whole debt can increase
a ﬁrm's access to capital. In particular, reﬁnancing risk can lead to a ﬁrm being frozen out of time-0 credit
markets if it attempts to issue non-callable debt. By allowing the ﬁrm to reﬁnance in two diﬀerent periods,
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make-whole debt reduces the reﬁnancing risk faced by the ﬁrm and so can alleviate market shutdowns in time
0. Second, make-whole debt increases access to capital: ﬁrms can generally issue more debt as make-whole
than otherwise.
We demonstrate these eﬀects by considering whether a ﬁrm with a given set of parameters will be able
to access credit markets for each type of debt. The outcome variable here is how open or closed the credit
market is, which is measured by whether the Euler equation for bondholders can be satisﬁed for some
interest rate and, if not, the minimal gap across interest rates. Thus a value of zero corresponds to open
credit markets, while larger ﬁgures correspond to credit markets that are farther from being open. We ﬁrst
ﬁx the underlying productivity process and consider how access to credit markets varies with a ﬁrm's initial
productivity state (on a scale of 1-21) and the amount of capital the ﬁrm is seeking to invest. The following
plots illustrate the credit market outcomes6:
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The top plot concerns non-callable debt while the bottom plot presents results for make-whole debt. For
each plot, the x-axis represents the ﬁrm's initial productivity level (on a 21-point grid). Higher numbers
here correspond to higher initial productivity levels (which correspond, in turn, to reduced credit risk.) The
y-axis plots the level of investment, k0, that the ﬁrm wishes to undertake. This investment is directly linked
to the amount of debt that ﬁrms issue since they will fund investment ﬁrst with their limited initial equity,
and then by issuing debt. Lastly, the z-axis gives a measure of how open or closed credit markets are.
Speciﬁcally, it plots the minimal gap in the Euler equation across all interest rates for debt of a speciﬁc
amount and for a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Levels of zero correspond to the ﬁrm being able to access credit markets and
borrow that amount, while levels above zero imply that there is no interest rate satisfying the bondholder's
Euler equation. In the latter case, the magnitude of the variable on the z-axis indicates just how signiﬁcant
the credit shutdown is: it gives a measure of the dollar transfer that the lender would need to make the loan.
Thus we see that access to make-whole bonds has two signiﬁcant eﬀects. First, for a given level of
investment, poorer-quality ﬁrms gain access to credit by issuing make-whole bonds whereas they otherwise
would not be able to access credit markets through non-callable debt. For investment levels near the middle
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of the distribution, only about the top half of ﬁrms (in terms of initial productivity) have access to credit
market through non-callable bonds, whereas all ﬁrms can access credit markets through make-whole bonds.
We see that this eﬀect is greater for ﬁrms with lower initial productivity levels, corresponding to the empirical
pattern that ﬁrms with lower credit ratings are more likely to issue make-whole debt. Second, for a given
level of initial productivity, ﬁrms can borrow far more with make-whole debt than they would be able to
with non-callable debt. For ﬁrms in the middle of the productivity distribution, make-whole bonds allow
them to borrow roughly twice as much as non-callable bonds. This also matches the empirical evidence that
issuance of make-whole debt and high-investment policies tend to be signiﬁcantly linked.
5.4 Full Model
We now extend this model to an inﬁnite-horizon setting in which ﬁrms dynamically choose their reﬁnancing
policy. Investment, as in the previous model, takes place entirely in the ﬁrst period. Firms ﬁnance their
investment ﬁrst with initial equity and then with one of four instruments: one-period debt, two-period
noncallable debt, two-period make-whole debt, and additional equity. The projects have stochastic maturity
where the completion date of the project follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ. Firms need
to maintain their initial source of funding until their project matures, at which point they realize cash
ﬂows from the project, pay ﬁnancing costs, and distribute the rest of the proceeds to initial equityholders.
As before, ﬁrms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and both equityholders and bondholders
discount cash ﬂows at a constant discount factor β.
Note as before that reﬁnancing risk here comes from both the stochastic maturity of the project and the
time-varying ﬁrm conditions. The ﬁrm is required to maintain its source of ﬁnancing until a realization of the
project maturity, but in the meanwhile its idiosyncratic productivity independently ﬂuctuates. Moreover,
as time passes, interest accumulates on debt that the ﬁrm has borrowed, thus requiring the ﬁrm to ﬁnance
increasingly large amounts to continue the project. (This is one signiﬁcant sense in which there is time
dependence in this problem and it cannot be thought of as a series of static problems; another is the
autocorrelation of the productivity shock.)
Comparing the forms of ﬁnancing, we see that they have very diﬀerent implications for reﬁnancing risk
and ﬁrm value. Additional equity never needs to be reﬁnanced, but is subject to issuance costs and does
not feature the interest rate tax shield. One period debt must be reﬁnanced every period and two period
noncallable debt must be reﬁnanced every other period (in the absence of a project maturity.) Two period
make-whole debt may be reﬁnanced either one or two periods after issuance. The ﬁrm will optimally choose
23
to reﬁnance one period after issuance if credit markets are open (i.e. there is no gap in the Euler condition)
and equity value is maximized compared to waiting. It is important to keep in mind that it is not always
optimal for the ﬁrm to reﬁnance in the period following issuance as it will likely pay a higher interest rate
(it will be reﬁnancing at a higher leverage).
The payoﬀs in each state largely follow from the previous model, and the time-0 value functions can be
written in simpliﬁed form as follows (the time-t value functions are identical but for the optimization over
the capital stock):
For a ﬁrm issuing one-period debt:
V one0 = max
k0
E
[
λβ(payoﬀ from project maturing next pd) + (1− λ)β1{refi}V one1
]
For a ﬁrm issuing two-period noncallable debt:
V two,nc0 =
max
k0
E
[
λβ(payoﬀ from project maturing next pd) + λ(1− λ)β2(payoﬀ from project maturing in two pds) + (1− λ)2β21{refi}V two,nc2
]
For a ﬁrm issuing two-period make-whole debt:
V two,mw0 = maxk0
E{λβ(payoﬀ from project maturing next pd) + (1− λ)β1{reﬁ in 1}V two,mw1 +
λ(1− λ) (1− 1{reﬁ in 1})β2(payoﬀ from project maturing in two pds) + (1− λ)2β21{reﬁ in 2}V two,mw2 ]
For a ﬁrm issuing additional equity:
V e0 = max
k0
E
[
λβ(payoﬀ from project maturing next pd) + (1− λ)βV e1
]
We utilize this framework to ask two major questions. First, what are the investment impacts of ﬁrms
having access to make-whole debt? That is, do ﬁrms invest more when they can ﬁnance this investment
with an instrument that mitigates reﬁnancing risk? Second, how much of an impact does this additional
instrument have on the overall equity value of a ﬁrm?
For the ﬁrst question, we see that ﬁrms that issue make-whole debt often invest signiﬁcantly more than
those issuing other forms of ﬁnancing, and that this eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms that face greater reﬁnancing
risk (in the form of longer project maturities.) The two ﬁgures below illustrate this eﬀect (recall that a higher
lambda means that a project is more likely to mature sooner). For both this and the following sets of plots,
the results are shown for time-0 ﬁrms (and hence leverage is computed using the initial equity and desired
capital levels). As this leverage increases, the reﬁnancing risk increases and the eﬀects are more signiﬁcant
than those below.
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The diﬀerences in the level of investment are often stark, with ﬁrms investing 50-100% more in certain
cases with make-whole debt compared to with other forms of debt. Despite the coarseness of the grids on
which this model is solved, it seems that this diﬀerence is larger for ﬁrms with lower initial productivity.
This again suggests that less creditworthy ﬁrms beneﬁt more by issuing make-whole debt, consistent with the
empirical evidence. We similarly see that the diﬀerences in equity values vary with the level of reﬁnancing
risk (again through the channel of lambda):
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We see that the diﬀerences in equity value can also be signiﬁcant. Firms issuing make-whole debt have
equity values that are 4.9-11.2% higher in the high lambda case, and 27.6-51.5% higher in the low lambda
(higher reﬁnancing risk) case. Consistent with the empirical evidence, we also see that, the lower a ﬁrm's
idiosyncratic productivity (and thus the higher its credit risk), the greater its beneﬁts from issuing make-
whole debt, in that these ﬁrms have higher equity values under make-whole debt relative to their equity
values under both forms of non-callable debt.
6 Conclusion
This paper began by demonstrating that not all callable bonds are created equal, and that the diﬀerences
among callable bonds are in fact very important. We saw that call provisions have become exceedingly
popular in bonds issued by U.S. nonﬁnancial corporations, but that much of this recent increase came from
make-whole bonds. These make-whole bonds diﬀer from traditional callable bonds in one very important
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way: their embedded call options are set at a price so low that they are virtually never in the money.
This had several implications. First, we saw that previous motivations for the issuance of callable bonds
based on mitigating asymmetric information and underinvestment problems by giving shareholders an option
that would appreciate with the value of the bond no longer hold. Since the value of the make-whole call
option does not move signiﬁcantly with the value of the underlying bond, the incentives to equityholders are
critically weakened. Second, the mitigation of risk shifting as an explanation of callable bonds was no longer
valid either. The decrease in option value from taking on risky projects pales in comparison to the potential
beneﬁt to equityholders and again the mitigation of incentives for managers is simply not strong enough.
Lastly, make-whole bonds do not allow ﬁrms to engage in interest rate risk management by construction:
the price the ﬁrm pays varies with market interest rates.
Given these issues with existing explanations for the issuance of callable bonds, we sought to propose our
own rationale. In order to do this, we ﬁrst established three empirical facts. First, the issuance of make-whole
bonds began to increase signiﬁcantly around the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in the U.S. Second, the issuance
of make-whole bonds was (and is) far more prevalent for lower-rated corporations than for higher-rated ones.
Third, investment policies and the issuance of make-whole bonds are closely linked: ﬁrms that invest more
(as a fraction of their earnings) are more likely to issue make-whole bonds, and ﬁrms that issue make-whole
bonds tend to invest more of the proceeds.
These empirical facts motivated the use of reﬁnancing risk as a mechanism for explaining the issuance of
make-whole debt. In particular, ﬁrms face the risk of rolling over their debt in tight credit market conditions
and as a result prefer ﬂexibility in when they can reﬁnance their debt, something aﬀorded to them by make-
whole bonds. We showed that this is a stronger motive for ﬁrms with higher credit risk since they are more
sensitive to credit market ﬂuctuations and for ﬁrms that invest more since their capital is more irreversible.
Then we embedded this friction into a simple model and showed that make-whole debt achieves two powerful
beneﬁts. First, it expands access to credit markets for ﬁrms with lower levels of productivity, and, second, it
allows almost all ﬁrms to borrow and invest more. These features help explain why make-whole bonds have
become so common and why their increasing prevalence in response to increased awareness of the eﬀects of
tight credit markets makes sense from a ﬁrm's perspective.
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8 Appendices and Figures
Figure 1: Total Par Value of Debt Issuances by Type, 1986-2012
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After decreasing in popularity in the early 1990s, callable bonds have become far more common and
currently represent the overwhelming majority of bonds issues by U.S. nonﬁnancial corporations.
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Figure 2: Total Debt Issuance by Type of Callable Bond, 1985-2014
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The usage of non-make-whole callable bonds decreased signiﬁcantly post-1999, while the usage of make-
whole bonds began to increase. The increase in the prevalence of make-whole bonds has been even more
pronounced since the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008.
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These plots show the same aggregate trends as the two above. We note that callable bonds represent
over 90% of both the total number of bonds and the total par value of bonds issued in the last year (and
over the last ﬁve years), with the majority of this coming from make-whole bonds.
36
Figure 3: An Extreme Example of Make-Whole Debt
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This ﬁgure replicates the example in Section 2.1 of a ﬁrm that has issued a 5-year bond at par with 5.5%
annual coupon payments. The payoﬀs represent the proceeds/prices that the ﬁrm would have to pay after
the second year of the bond, assuming a make-whole spread of 30bps. and a reissuance spread of 0bps. Note
that even in the case where the ﬁrm can issue at the risk-free rate, interest rates have to be quite low for
the ﬁrm to proﬁt by calling make-whole debt and reissuing an identical bond.
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Figure 4: Costs of Early Retirement by Debt Type
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The prices paid for early retirement for non-MW callable and MW callable debt are fairly similar (MW
is slightly higher) and range from 90 percent of par to 110 percent of par for over 95% of the bonds retired,
while the prices paid for early retirement for non-callable bonds have a greater median (by about 5% of par)
and exhibit signiﬁcant positive skew, suggesting that callable and make-whole bonds oﬀer are far less risky
options for early retirement.
38
Figure 5: Fraction of Debt Issuance that is Callable by Firm Credit Rating,
1986-2012
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Firms with lower credit ratings (more credit risk) are more likely to issue their debt as callable and
were quicker to adopt callable debt. This trend is similar for make-whole callable debt and is fairly robust
across diﬀerent measures of credit risk (such as leverage and income volatility) and breakpoints of credit risk
categories.
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Figure 6: Fraction of Debt Issuance that is Callable by Firm Investment, 1986-
2012
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Firms with higher ratios of investment to operating income are more likely to issue their debt as callable
and their use of call provisions is less sensitive to market conditions. This trend is similar for make-whole
callable debt and is fairly robust across diﬀerent ratios for investment. Note that it also controls for changes
in the average ratios of investment to operating income since the ﬁrms are re-sorted each year.
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Table 1: Uses of Issuance Proceeds
Cash Net PP&E Dividends
Pre-issue level
1.3184*** 1.3159*** 0.5549***
(.002) (.001) (.006)
MW Issue
-232.565 1794.49*** -9.927**
(734.31) (284.05) (3.295)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 17,079 17,079 17,079
Within-R2 0.9295 0.9869 0.1692
These ﬁxed eﬀects regressions are constructed by regressing the accounting variable for a ﬁrm the year
after it issues a bond on the variable the year before and an indicator variable for whether the bond issue
was a make-whole callable issue. Thus, the coeﬃcients for MW Issue should be interpreted as the change
in the relevant variable after accounting for the pre-issue level relative to all other bonds. The variables are
in millions of dollars, and all variables are winsorized at 1%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
industry level.
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